I Can See Clearly Now…

I appreciated the segue this week from Durkheim to Tönnies and the opportunity to see their pursuits in parallel (or perhaps more appropriately, perpendicular) to one another. Tönnies writes, “We can of course observe the life of human beings, and consequently their social life, from the ‘outside,’ but it is only from the ‘inside’ that we can understand it…” (NofS 88) Tönnies’ psychologically-grounded pursuit as such runs counter to Durkheim’s external, statistically-based approach. For Tönnies, the idea of second nature is a basic assumption underlying his conception of essential will and Gemeinschaft: “what we express when we say that habit is ingrown and has become our second nature and when we speak of the immeasurable influence that the habits of every person have on how he acts as well as on what he wishes and what he things…” (NS 96) Not so for Durkheim, “It is precisely these schematic, summary representations which constitute the prenotions that we employ in our normal way of life. Thus we cannot visualise their existence being called into question, since we see it at the same time as we see our own. Not only are they within us, but since they are the product of repeated experiences, they are invested with a kind of ascendancy and authority, by dint of repetition and the habit which results from it.” “Thus everything conspires to make us see in them the true social reality.” (63) He continues, “the details of social life swamp the consciousness from all sides, it has not a sufficiently strong perception of the details to feel the reality behind them.” (63) For Durkheim, we need a way to step outside and statistics are the sociologists instrument – like a telescope to divine a reality obscured by the fact that we live within it.

Yet both are out to scientize sociology and get a better grasp at the ties that bind and connect us. As Ruthie pointed out, Tönnies articulates his method (in drawing a distinction between it and that of botanists and zoologists): “My method is comparable to that of the chemist rather than that of the descriptive natural sciences. It is a matter of isolation (Scheidung) rather than distinction (Unterscheidung). The point is to decompose the phenomenon of the social relation into its elements, and conceptually to set free these elements, whether or not their pure formation occurs in real life.” (NofS 91) Phil linked this to a conceptual periodic table, and I add that this fits with his version of scientized sociology – it can be built up from basic units. Use the theory to create new compounds – to predict behavior based on the inner workings. That is, if we know how people work, we can figure out everything, as opposed to the statistical approach of Durkheim, where given lots of data, we can see what the effects are, how people are buffeted by the currents. In contrast to Durkheim, Tönnies sees sociology as a theoretical science: “But to conceptualize social relationships is the foremost task of a purely theoretical science of sociology. It differs from the natural sciences by virtue of the fact that its objects can neither be made visible by either telescope or microscope nor be perceived by the other senses. Only thought is capable of discerning them. They are a product of thought because they are abstracted from real life situations, that is, from the facts of social interaction.” (NS 93)

Tönnies continues to reference the sociologists interest in human units (NofS 100) throughout: “For some of the units I have mentioned can be studied biologically, since their unity rests on natural facts of procreation and birth, descent and hereditary characteristics, while at the same time they are imbued with a psychological valuation as units that are carriers of social ideas.” (NofS 99-100) And in Community and Civil Society he turns to the idea of ‘metaphysical’ atoms (CCS 20). “The total output of Society is composed of such atoms, to which each individual contributes.” (CCS 57)

The trouble with this, as Harrigan brought up, are the assumptions it is based on. Tönnies writes: “Man is by nature inclined towards affirmation of man, and therefore to union with him…” (NS 89) Is this nature or, as he himself says, habit that has become ingrown? Shortly after that, Tönnies then notes to the contrary, “But it is no more valid than the opposite thesis that, being by nature egotistic, or asocial, he becomes social as he makes reasoned judgments about his own well-understood interests; that he behaves socially only according to circumstances, that is, when and inasmuch as he thinks it will be to his advantage to come to terms and seek a working arrangement with his opponent-for to a degree, at least potentially, everyone is everyone's opponent.” (NS 91) This dualistic character of human nature sets up Tönnies’ notion of Gemeinshaft and Gesellschaft: “I maintain that each of these opposite theses holds good, that each in its own area is valid and applicable, that they complement each other. The former is basic for the concept of Gemeinschaft, the latter for the concept of Gesellschaft.” (NS 91) From two “atoms” of human behavior – “essential will” and arbitrary or “rational will,” different variations of society emerge.

There’s Something Happening Here, What It Is Ain’t Exactly Clear…

As with Marx (and as Robbie pointed out, the unnaturalness of the using of wood becoming a crime of theft), Tönnies is troubled by this shift to the urban, to industrialization, to mechanization, and the market and what it’s done to the natural state of union between people. For Tönnies, a description of Gemeinschaft went: “Community life means mutual possession and enjoyment, and possession and enjoyment of goods held in common.” (CCS 36) and continuing, “In the same way the possession of all property resides ultimately in the whole community and in its central authority, so long as that is thought of as representative of the whole.” (CCS 38) This differs markedly from the state of affairs in Gesellschaft, where “For a thing to have any value in market Society it is only necessary that it should be possessed by one party to the exclusion of others, and that it should be desired by some of the excluded.” (CCS 55) He goes on to talk about how this connects to the state: “Since all relationships in Gesellschaft rest upon comparing potential and offered services against each other, it becomes clear why relations to visible material objects take precedence; mere deeds and words cannot form any real basis for these relations. This is the exact opposite of what happens in Gemeinschaft, which as a bond of "blood" is first and foremost a physical relationship, expressing itself in deeds and words, and where a joint relation to objects is second nature, because goods are not so much exchanged as possessed and used in common. Furthermore Gesellschaft, in what we might call its moral aspects, is very closely linked to the state.” (CCS 66)

In Gesselschaft, bonds of blood are traded for acts of rational will. I mentioned in class the arts organization I was a part of back in Detroit. On the inside, it felt loose and communal. We chose to be there, to come together, to dream up this thing. As we planned larger things, from the outside at least, it felt like an institution, and yet, as Tönnies puts it, “the very fact of their being entities entirely depends upon the minds of the members” (NS 103) and “through the will of their members, others taking notice…” (NS 101) For, “any group of persons can call into being an association, if they will it in common, and can agree on it, and in doing so they perform an act of pretense or fiction.” (NS 101) As Tönnies writes, “a social union is a fiction” (NS 100) And I can’t help but think from my experience, that it is something we invent out of “whole cloth,” that is a fiction of community (As fabric) and of the fibers (the units – people) that make it up. If we’d decided to walk away, the institution disappeared – which also meant our responsibilities to it grew beyond their fictional origins. Yet it felt very real, and perhaps surreal in its fictional realness at the time. Tönnies links this to the origins of the State – proposing it’s out of something natural, and at a certain scale, what holds it together is not blood, but the rules of Gesellschaft that necessarily spring into being.

Maybe the crazy person shouting at me on the subway is onto something?

Phil offered the colorful example of the “asshole on the subway,” violating the social constructs of keeping our “proper” distance and forcing their presence, and they hope, our attention, on them. I’ve been thinking on this since then, and witnessed subsequent examples that speak to that. One in particular made me think perhaps they’re worth paying more attention to than perhaps given credit. About to cross a street on a crowded sidewalk (this was not on the subway) a man mutters loudly about everyone on their cell phones. Not a longwinded barrage, but enough to make me look up. And, in front of me, crossing the street (against the light, with traffic coming) about three-quarters of the people are busy chatting away, oblivious to those around them (and traffic bearing down on them…) We might see the cell phone as enabling extended Gemeinschaft connections (at a distance) and to some degree Tönnies (and perhaps we) might see this as a positive thing – a reinforcement of the natural/communal in the face of the unnatural/societal. But at the same time it prevents us from making any such bonds (or even exhibiting some form of politeness) with those we actually, physically, encounter. (Last night, in my building, on an already crowded elevator, a girl gets on and continues her conversation loudly about being at the bar the previous night – were we invisible? She neither acknowledged us with a greeting of Gemeinschaft or the polite, silence of Gesellschaft.) I won’t argue that the crazy people on the street and in the subway are still crazy, but maybe they’re right in not buying into something that’s not quite right going on all around us.

And this is the sort of cynicism that Tönnies is expressing (albeit in a more socially acceptable format) as he watches the communal life of villages, people who know each other and take care of each other, disappearing, subsumed by this other “arbitrary” nonessential will. At the same time, given the growing scale of society (from community) some sort of agreed upon rules – Gesellschaft are necessary, and he clearly recognizes that. Perhaps then, we might ask, from an overly idealistic stand point, is it possible to expand the notion of Gemeinschaft to a larger scope, to get people to see the connections, the kinship that exists between us all, and transform Gesellschaft into Gemeinschaft, make community out of society? – Nick

Tangentially

This passage: “The city council will take care that nothing is exported which the city might need for itself, and that nothing harmful is brought in,” (CCS 51) brought to mind the film “Darwin’s Nightmare.” The film was centered in Tanzania around Lake Victoria, and the effects of the Nile Perch on the lake’s ecosystem, the village’s economy, and much more. Among many unbearable sights, this fish, which completely destroyed the ecosystem of the lake, was shipped for large sums to fancy restaurants in Europe, while the people of the town starved, fed the dried scraps left behind from the fish then thrown on the road. There are scenes of kids smoking Styrofoam fish packing with no food to eat. It illustrates Tönnies passage well – a city getting rid of what it needs and bringing in only harmful things (gun runners were also a part of the film) at the expense of the people. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwin's_Nightmare